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FORUM: COMMENT
Who Determines Children's Best Interests?
MICHAEL GROSSBERG
Danaya Wright's analysis of English child custody law is thoughtful and
thought provoking. Through an excursion deep into English legal history,
she not only contextualizes the De Manneville case but also convincingly
demonstrates that child custody has long been contested and that those con-
tests have always contained an incendiary mix of policies and practices.
Wright's article documents that the key elements of custody conflicts-
property, children's needs, and paternal and maternal rights and claims-
have distinct and collective histories and that both defy easy analysis. In
doing so, her essay makes it clear that these cases have always been diffi-
cult because they involve changing and clashing interests and because
common law tribunals are the setting for their definition and application.
Consequently, her essay is a compelling example of the benefits of locat-
ing a case in its particular place and time.
Wright's essay has a dual message. She argues that the significance and
meaning of the De Manneville case have been consistently misunderstood;
and then she contends that misreadings of the case illuminate substantive
and methodological problems with our understanding of custody law in
particular and legal history in general. Specifically, she maintains that an-
alyzing De Manneville correctly reveals the resistance of late eighteenth
and early nineteenth-century English jurists to notions of mother's rights
and a best interest of the child standard in custody law. Documenting this
judicial resistance uncovers "both the complex interrelationship between
the law of custody and family relations and the role of law in maintaining
patriarchal power structures despite ideological shifts that seemingly call
for the recognition and protection of maternal claims to children."' These
revelations, in turn, pose questions about the use of law as historical evi-
l. Danaya C. Wright, "De Manneville v. De Manneville: Rethinking the Birth of Custo-
dy Law under Patriarchy," Law and History Review 17 (1999): 250.
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dence for social practices and attitudes and thus provide needed cautions
to social historians about the use of legal evidence.
Wright's argument is built on the inIdisputable assumption that if the
sources of custody law conflicts are revealed to be much more complex than
previously assumed, then sO, too, must be their meaning and significance
in their time and over time. Following that logic, I would like to compli-
cate the issues a bit further by probing afew parts of her analysis to sug-
gest that the conflicts she so ably chronicles might be read a little differ-
ently. I want to do so by discussing briefly three issues that seem to me to
be central to her argument: doctrinal standards, judicial beliefs, and com-
parative experiences.
At the heart of Wright's argument is the "Best Interests of the Child"
doctrine. In many ways the doctrine itself is the primary story of the es-
say. Its rise, fall, and ultimate triumphant resurrection is central to Wright's
assertions of non-linear change. In her reading of the doctrine's history, De
Manneville is significant because it reversed a rising commitment to the
best interest of the child standard and the maternal rights that must accom-
pany it. As she puts it, De Manneville occurred when "courts were mov-
ing toward a more discretionary law that would accommodate the pyscho-
logical and economic needs of all children." This meant that "the legal
relationship of the parent and child would be mediated through the legal
relationship of the husband and wife. Judges would focus on the disrup-
tive potential of interspousal custody disputes as the evil to be avoided,
rather than on the good of settling custody under a meaningful welfare
standard."2
I wonder, however, whether Wright might present child welfare in the
same nuanced way that she analyzes maternal rights and coverture. Her
rendition of the best interest doctrine tends to turn it into a rather ahistor-
ical set of practices and policies instead of ones constructed in particular
historical moments. Such a formulation seems to assume a constancy in
meanings of children's welfare and thus feeds the kind of ahistoricism
associated with the Lloyd deMause school of children's history: the past
not as a different place but a nightmare. 3 Alternatively, we might search
that past to discover that conceptions of child welfare have a history and
then link those changing conceptions to experiences of children and par-
ents. Doing so would compel us to recover assumptions about the inter-
ests and needs of children embedded in an Anglo-American property based
notion of custody rather than simply assuming that such a regime was in-
2. Ibid., 257.
3. Lloyd deMause, ed., The History of Childhood (New York: Psychohistory Press, 1974).
For a compelling recent analysis of the history of children, see Hugh Cunningham, "Review
Essay: Histories of Children," American Historical Review 103 (1998): 1191-1208.
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herently resistant to any notions of child welfare. Such a doctrinal recla-
mation project might well help us reformulate generalizations about ma-
jor shifts in family law-such as the movement from property to nurture
in custody law-in much broader terms by trying to understand issues like
child welfare or children's interests as constantly changing and dynamic
concepts. It is worth noting, for example, that even in one of the most egre-
gious and heart-wrenching cases that Wright chronicles, Rex v. Greenhill,
Lord Denman declared: "But I think that the case ought to be decided on
more general grounds; because any doubts left on the minds of the public
as to the right to claim the custody of children might lead to dreadful dis-
putes, and even endanger the lives of persons at the most helpless age." 4
Such declarations clearly contain within them distinct notions of child
welfare and interests as well as the assumption that paternal and children's
interests are inseparable. Our challenge is to understand their meaning in
1836 and to historicize such contentions and the clashes that they helped
provoke within the broader legal and family conflicts of the era rather than
to assume a complete "disjuncture between social beliefs and legal rules."5
Such a reconceptualization of the history of doctrines like the best in-
terest of the child rule is particularly critical for an argument like Wright's
because her doctrinal exegesis straddles one of the great divides in Anglo-
American legal history. The timing and depth of change in eighteenth and
early nineteenth-century British and North American law remain central
and contentious issues among historians studying topics from contract to
labor relations to constitutionalism to family law. 6 As Wright notes, their
multiple views are less and less easily characterized with formulations such
as a shift from patriarchy to egalitarianism or by assertions that that legal
change was either linear or uniform. And yet that insight ought to be ap-
plied to child welfare and the best interest doctrine as well. It may well be
that rather than the emergence of a newfound recognition of an ever-present
conception of children's interests, what changed in the era were both le-
gal and social constructions of children and their welfare. In this context
it is worth noting that the best interest doctrine itself has a rather check-
ered past that defies attributing to it a singular meaning. After surveying
its history, Lee Teitelbaum concluded that the doctrine was an empty ves-
sel into which the prejudices of the moment were always poured. Wright's
deft analysis of the doctrine's legal parentage helps us understand why.
4. Cited in Wright, "De Manneville v. De Manneville," 293-94.
5. Ibid., 302.
6. See, for example, David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal
Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Chris-
toper Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993).
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The notion that disputes over child custody expressed in part shifting
ideas of child welfare and thus parental rights brought about by political,
economic, and social transformations suggests the need to examine the
framework of custody law conflicts more closely and not just their out-
comes. It may well be, for instance, that the best interest of the child doc-
trine ought to be considered as yet another example of the refinements that
occurred in so many categories of nineteenth-century Anglo-American law.7
Analyzing the doctrine in such terms raises the issue of judicial beliefs and
practices because of the central role that common law judges played in the
elaboration of nineteenth-century law. The role of judges as doctrinal cre-
ators is a particularly critical element in debates about the nature of legal
change in this era. Wright tends to portray judges in rather stark terms. In
the years before De Manneville she depicts them as examples of progres-
sive thought because they slowly but surely recognized child welfare and
maternal rights; in years after the decision judges become patriarchal de-
fenders of the male authority who conspired to thwart progressive change.
Judicial retrogression is clearly labeled: judges used the "rhetoric of chil-
dren's interests" and they paid mere "lip service" to best interests doctrine
early in the nineteenth century.8
I have questions about this portrayal of the English bench, not so much
because I fault Wright's analysis of particular cases, but rather because her
assessment of judicial intent fails to grapple sufficiently with the depth and
logic of judicial opposition to the claims of mothers. The presentation tends
to defang patriarchalism by implying that it had no intellectual and ideo-
logical mooring beyond the mere defense of power and thus could not re-
sist a "real" best interest of the child argument. Such a depiction of judi-
cial logic unduly simplifies the conflicts over male authority that erupted
throughout Britain and North America in courtrooms and legislative cham-
bers as well as in homes. And thus it alsotends to downplay the breadth
and severity of the disputes and chaos created by basic changes in family
lives and family law litigation.
Wright explains herargument by declaring: "What I endeavor to uncover
in this article is both the complex interrelationship between the law of
custody and family relations and the role of law in maintaining patriarchal
power structures despite ideological shifts that seemingly call for the rec-
ognition and protection of maternal claims to children. If law protects rather
than breaks down paternal rights to children, during a period of rising
maternal rights discourse, the role of law as evidence for making histori-
7. For an assessment of American family law in these terms, see Michael Grossberg,
Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1985).
8. Wright, "De Manneville v. De Manneville," 249, 248.
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cal claims about social practices and attitudes is open to question." I won-
der whether the trajectory of change was as clear or as clearly linear as these
words suggest. And I wonder whether recovering the full range of the cus-
tody contests-including the voices of litigants and lawyers-over paren-
tal rights and child welfare might indeed provide illuminating evidence for
historical claims about social practices and attitudes by treating legal be-
liefs and practices as both products and sources of change in the era rath-
er than as parts of an autonomous legal realm. Part of such a recovery
project would be an assessment of the struggles over the morality and utility
of separating the family into a collection of distinct individuals, each with
his or her own rights, duties, and interests. In the 1840 Philadelphia
d'Hauteville child custody case, for instance, the lawyer for the father rested
part of his defense of patriarchal authority on the assertion of the funda-
mental unity of families and family roles. He argued that a woman who
admittedly failed as a wife simply could not succeed as a mother. Family
roles, he argued, were inseparable and bound together within a corporate
whole.9 And thus I wonder about the use of the modernization language
of backward and forward to capture family law changes. Rather than ar-
guing that law "took a backward, patriarchal turn," and that "we must ques-
tion whether a growing egalitarianism occurred in family life despite the
strict patriarchy of custody law, or whether the patriarchal imperatives of
this and other so-called 'family laws' undermine historians' claims about
social changes in the early nineteenth century,"' 0 I wonder whether child
custody and other family law contests might be presented in ways that
recovered the full range of beliefs of the era and that analyzed why courts
continued to be a central arena for such struggles.
Finally, and admittedly moving a bit beyond Wright's essay, I think that
questions about the timing and meaning of doctrines and debates that
ranged over decades and jurisdictions raise an important issue of method.
As Wright notes periodically, Anglo-American custody law has a transat-
lantic past. Nineteenth-century judges, lawyers, and litigants were well
aware of the legal cases and conflicts that raged throughout North Ameri-
ca and Britain. So, too, are historians. And since in some quite revealing
ways the trajectory of change differed in the United States, as did the na-
ture of the debate, such a comparison can be used to pose questions about
the connections between judicial intent and doctrinal change.
Particularly significant for building on Wright's argument is the fact that
comparison highlights the historiographical significance of institutional
structures. The American federal system in which each state had jurisdic-
9. Michael Grossberg, A Judgment for Solomon: The d'Hauteville Case and Legal Expe-
rience in Antebellum America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 97-100.
10. Wright, "De Manneville v. De Manneville," 253.
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tion over domestic relations produced a range of custody and other family
laws and thus exemplified the kind of legal variations that would lead Louis
Brandeis to laud states as legal laboratories. Most significantly for Wright's
argument, the various American jurisdictions and decisions fostered a de-
bate that challenges assertions of a singular custody law. Britain's unitary
legal order may well have stymied the use of the courts to stage such a
similarly full debate, but comparison illuminates the larger context in which
arguments by English mothers and their lawyers occurred and the possi-
bilities of reading English custody precedents quite differently then and
now. In particular, such a comparison seems to challenge the notion that
custody law changes in the larger Anglo-North American legal world oc-
curred in a clearly periodized scheme of progress, retrogression, and tri-
umph. 1 At the same time, comparison may also provide a way to explore
some of the key issues in custody law change that Wright identifies. For
example, she notes in passing the potential significance of examining the
impact of revolutionary change on family law rules like custody and the
role of religion in domestic relations cases and conflicts. These issues are
ripe for comparative analysis. In other words, comparison raises questions
about the nature and meaning of Anglo-American law as a unified realm
of legal rules and legal experiences. Putting custody law into comparative
perspective would compel us to explain what sort of a legal world was this?
How was it connected? And how and why did its various realms remain
distinct?
As I hope I have indicated, I think Wright's essay is a significant con-
tribution not only to the history of child custody law but to our efforts to
understand how to explore the legal past. I have tried to suggest how I think
her argument might be engaged and pushed a bit to deepen our understand-
ing of both of these critical issues. Doing so is important for many reasons,
not the least of which is the continuing reality that custody cases remain
some of the most bitter and painful legal disputes in Britain and North
America. Wright's essay helps us see why that has always been so.
11. For an American version of this argument, see Jamil Zainaldin, "The Emergence of a
Modern Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851," Northwestern
University Law Review 72 (1979): 1038-89. For a different reading, see Grossberg, Gov-
erning the Hearth, chap. 7.
